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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of THOMAS DELANO,
Petitioner,
-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 0 1-06-ST7260 Index No. 7550-06
Appearances :

Thomas Delano
Inmate No. 02-A-2779
Petitioner, Pro Se
Camp Pharsalia Correctional Facility
Route 23
South Plymouth, NY 13844
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Bridget E. Holohan,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
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an inmafa at Gomp Phomnlia Carrcutitlnal Facility, lrna ~ t ~ i n m the
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instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated Dccember
20, 2005 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving a term of
two and one half years to five years for conviction of the crime of burglary third degree. He
was on parole supervision at the time he committed the crime. Among the many arguments
set forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the Parole Board failed to consider his
accomplishments while he has been incarcerated. He points out that he obtained a certificate
in Phase I11 Transitional Services and completed the Alcoholics Anonymous and ASAT
programs. He indicates that he completed the custodial maintenance program. He has
worked over 200 hours in a community based work crew. He has annexed to his petition a
number of letters of support. He indicates he has an excellent disciplinary record. Petitioner
criticizes the Parole Board for not considering the factors under Executive Law 6 259-i. In
his view the Parole Board improperly focused on the seriousness of the crime for which he
is incarcerated and that the actions of the Board were tantamount to a re-sentencing.
Petitioner maintains that the Parole Board violated his Due Process rights. He points out that
he is above the puideline range (ses 9 NYCRR 800 1.3 [c]). He a w x t q that the Pamle Rnwd
failed to provide a detailed explanation for its determination. Petitioner also contends that
the determination was the result of an executive policy adopted by Governor Pataki to deny
parole to violent felony offenders.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
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“Despite your receipt of an earned eligibility certificate, parole
is denied for the following reasons: After a careful review of
your record and your interview, it is the determination of this
panel that, if released at this time, there is a reasonable
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and your release at this time is incompatible
with the welfare and safety of the community. The decision is
based on the following factors:
“Your instant offense of burglary third by plea continues an
extensive history of criminal justice involvement dating to 1983
and including approximately seven misdemeanor and nine
felony convictions. Also noted are pad failures on community
supervision. It is noted that you were on parole when you
committed the instant crime.
Your programming and
disciplinary record since your last Board appearance have been
considered. Discretionary release must again be denied due to
your continuing criminal justice involvement, pattern of
burglary-related criminality and negative response to past
correctional influences. You are a career criminal who refuses
to stop breaking the law and if released at this time, there is a
reasonable probability that you will not remain at liberty without
violating the law.
“He is above the guidelines. Continuous involvement with the
criminal justice system, pattern of similar offenses, negative
response to past correctional influences.”
As stated in Executive Law 8259-i (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be ?ranted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
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education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate []; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law 4259-i [2] [c] [A]).
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review

(see Ristau

v.

Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality
bordering on impropriety’’ on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence
of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made

by the Parole Board

(see

Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294

AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
lhe Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
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factors as petitioner's institutional programming, his disciplinary record, his plans upon
release, and support letters in his file. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the
petitioner ofthe reasons for the denial ofparole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive
Law $259-i (see Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of
Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper
and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crimes
and their violent nature (seeMatter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d
906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189
AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as
the inmate's criminal history (E Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971;
Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not
required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining
the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (seeMatter of Farid v Travis, supra;
Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter
CfColladcr v New York-Ctate Divi+yofP_erdc, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3rd Dept., ?QOl]).Nor mist

the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of
Executive Law

5 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d

859 [3rd

Dept., 20061). In other words, "[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner's criminal history, together with the other
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statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare

of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a

guarantee of release (see,People ex rel. Justice v Russi, 226 AD2d 82 1 [3rd Dept., 19961;
Matter of Flecha v Russi, 22 1 AD2d 780 [3rd Dept., 19851; Matter of Walker v Russi, 176
AD2d 1185 [3rd Dept., 19911 lv dismissed 79 NY2d 897).
With respect to petitioner’s argument that he has served time in excess of the
guideline range (

~ NYCRR
9
800 1.3), the guidelines “are intended only as a guide, and are

not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each individual
case” (see 9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tdia

L

h ~ u lc~
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of Parole,

290 AD2d 907, 908 [3rd Dept., 20021). Thii?, the Coiirt finds that this dries not s ewc

3%3

basis to overturn the Board’s decision.
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a resentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple
punishments are conclusory and without merit

(see iblaller 01 Bockeno v New

k’ork Stare

Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961;Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
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DeDartrnent Board of Appeals Unit, 28 1 AD2d 672 [3'd Dept., 200 11; Mdtte~o f Fvaw v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). Moreover, it is well settled
that the Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set this c7q the minimum term
of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter
of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rdDept., 20061 lv denied

NY2d

-

[January 16,20071).
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument

(see Matter of

Lue-Shing v Pataki, 30 1 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter ofLittle v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051,
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061).
With respect to petitioner's argument that the Appeals Unit failed to icwe a timely
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR

5 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York

State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rdDept, 20001, Iv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex
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rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rdDept., 20001).
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to
due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law 6 2594, since it does not create
an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (seeBarna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2nd
Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40 [2ndCir., 200 13, at p. 44; Paunetto v Hammock (5 16

F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY,
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation.
With respect to petitioner's equal protection argument, the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within their jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, but does not prevent the States from making reasonable
classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of Equalization, 45 1 US 648'68

L Ed 2d 5 14, 523 101 S Ct 2070 [ 19813). Where the action under review does not involve
a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but rather is
examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the action violated the equal
protection clause (see,Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d
520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250). In this instance there is
simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that the respondent's
determination was motivated by impermissible considerations (see Giordano v City of New
York, 274 F3d 740, 751 [2ndCir., 20011).
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The Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months)
is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see,Matter of Tatta v State
ofNew York, Division ofParde, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, Iv denied 98 NY2d 604).
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without
merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
DecisiordOrder with notice of entry.

A

ENTER
Dated:

March'3C ,2007
Troy, New York
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1.
2.
3.

Order To Show Cause dated November 20,2006, Petition, Supporting
Papers and Exhibits
Respondent's Answer dated January 11,2007, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Affirmation of Bridget E. Holohan, Esq., dated January 1 1, 2007
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